sbc: fix 1-byte heap-OOB read in sbc_unpack_frame_internal
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PATCH 1/1 sbc: fix 1-byte heap-OOB read in sbc_unpack_frame_internal
Hi BlueZ maintainers,
While fuzzing libsbc with a libFuzzer + ASan harness exercising thepublic sbc_decode() entry point, I found a 1-byte heap-buffer-overflowREAD in sbc_unpack_frame_internal() at sbc/sbc.c:489. The off-by-one isin the bound check at line 486:
for (bit = 0; bit < bits[ch][sb]; bit++) { if (consumed > len * 8) <-- should be >= return -1;
if ((data[consumed >> 3] >> (7 - (consumed & 0x7))) & 0x01) audio_sample |= 1 << (bits[ch][sb] - bit - 1);
consumed++; }
When consumed == len * 8 the guard does not fire and the next linereads data[len], one byte past the input buffer.
The bug has been live since commit feb1bd57 (2011-10-19) — surviving theadjacent hardening in b3ae4260 ("sbc: Fix stack overflow read insbc_crc8.", 2018) which fixed a similar pattern in the CRC helper.
Reproducer:
- Standalone PoC (compiles against system libsbc, ASan-enabled): attached as poc_standalone.c- A 14-byte input is enough to reach the off-by-one: 9c bd b0 36 7d f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2
The proposed fix is a single-character change (> → >=); patchattached as 0001-sbc-fix-1-byte-heap-OOB-read-in-sbc_unpack_frame_int.patch.
Verified on git HEAD b3deb8a ("Release 2.2"). After the patch the sameinput is rejected cleanly by sbc_decode() (returns -1).
Impact assessment:
- Reachable via any A2DP audio frame (the SBC codec is mandatory for A2DP); also reachable via libsbc users such as PulseAudio/PipeWire BT modules, GStreamer's sbcparse/sbcdec, ofono, and most embedded BT audio gateways that link libsbc.- Primitive is a 1-byte out-of-bounds READ; in a long-lived audio pipeline the chunk neighborhood is attacker-shapeable across frames, so the strongest immediate use is a probabilistic info-leak / heap layout oracle. CVSSv3.1 (proposed): AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N (4.3 Medium)- AOSP/Android does NOT ship libsbc — Android's BT stack uses the OI Codec at bluedroid/embdrv/sbc/, which is a structurally different implementation and not affected by this exact bug. This issue has been assigned CVE-2026-16473 (via Red Hat SecurityResponse Team). Public references:
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-16473 - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2503650
I am including the id here for the commit record; please reference itwhen the fix is merged.
Thanks,
---Attachments:
- 0001-sbc-fix-1-byte-heap-OOB-read-in-sbc_unpack_frame_int.patch- poc_standalone.c
Oguzhan Akkaya
Security Engineer
Per.Mail: [email protected]
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From f4a2bc64faee408f925ae7800fc18a9213e1cc77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Oğuzhan Akkaya <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2026 16:27:03 -0400
Subject: [PATCH sbc] sbc: fix 1-byte heap-OOB read in sbc_unpack_frame_internal
To: [email protected]
Cc: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
The per-sample bit-reader at sbc.c:485-493 has an off-by-one bound check that allows the buffer-end to be reached and one byte to be read past the attacker-controlled SBC frame buffer.
When the cumulative consumed bit-position reaches len*8 exactly, the guard if (consumed > len * 8) does not fire, and the next statement indexes data[consumed >> 3] == data[len], one byte past the end of the input buffer. AddressSanitizer reports:
ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
READ of size 1
#0 sbc_unpack_frame_internal sbc.c:489
#1 sbc_decode sbc.c:1225
The bug has been present since commit feb1bd57 (2011-10-19, 'sbc:
Reduce for-loop induced indentation in sbc_unpack_frame'). It was not addressed by the adjacent hardening in b3ae4260 ('sbc: Fix stack overflow read in sbc_crc8.', 2018) which fixed a similar 1-byte over-read in sbc_crc8.
The fix changes the comparison to >= so that the guard fires when consumed would reach the byte beyond the buffer.
CVE: CVE-2026-16473
---
Found via a libFuzzer + AddressSanitizer harness around the public sbc_decode() entry point.
How to trigger — a 14-byte frame is enough to reach the off-by-one:
9c bd b0 36 7d f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2
On an ASan build, sbc_decode() on this input reports:
ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow READ of size 1
#0 sbc_unpack_frame_internal sbc.c:489
#1 sbc_decode sbc.c:1225
After the patch the same input is rejected cleanly (sbc_decode returns -1). Verified on git HEAD b3deb8a ("Release 2.2").
Impact: reachable via any A2DP audio frame (SBC is mandatory for A2DP) and via libsbc users such as PulseAudio/PipeWire BT modules, GStreamer sbcparse/sbcdec, and embedded BT audio gateways. The primitive is a 1-byte out-of-bounds READ; in a long-lived audio pipeline the neighbouring heap is attacker-shapeable across frames, so the strongest immediate use is a probabilistic info-leak / heap-layout oracle.
CVSSv3.1 (proposed): AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N (4.3 Medium).
Note: AOSP/Android does not ship libsbc — Android's BT stack uses the OI codec at bluedroid/embdrv/sbc/, a structurally different implementation not affected by this bug.
Assigned CVE-2026-16473 (via the Red Hat Security Response Team):
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-16473
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2503650
A standalone ~60-line ASan reproducer (poc_standalone.c) is available on request.
sbc/sbc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
sbc/sbc.c +1 -1
@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ static int sbc_unpack_frame_internal(const uint8_t *data, audio_sample =0 ;for (bit =0 ; bit < bits[ch][sb]; bit++) { -if (consumed > len *8 ) +if (consumed >= len *8 )return -1 ;if ((data[consumed >>3 ] >> (7 - (consumed &0x7 ))) &0x01 )
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0